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stringent exhaustion requirement permits only those serving lengthy
sentences to qualify for the federal writ. 43 A policy of rigid procedural
restraints on the writ seems unsound since it frustrates decisions on the
merits of at least some petitions that are, in fact, substantively meri-
torious. Such a policy, as Justice Douglas has noted, makes a "trap out
of the exhaustion doctrine which promises to exhaust the litigant and
his resources, not the remedies."' 44
SUFFICIENCY OF PROSECUTOR'S EVIDENCE
United States v. Taylor
The Supreme Court has observed "that proof of a criminal charge
beyond a reasonable doubt is constitutionally required."' 45 While the
concept of "beyond a reasonable doubt" is not synonymous with mathe-
matical certainty, 46 it is more exacting than the burden of proof re-
quired in civil actions, 147 with the distinction often expressed in terms
of probability of occurrence:
With respect to a normal issue in a civil case, one party loses if
the jury does not believe that existence of the fact is more
probable than its nonexistence .... With respect to a normal issue
in a criminal case, the state loses if the jury does not believe that
existence of the fact is so highly probable "as to dissipate all
reasonable doubt."' 48
case that can frustrate a decision on the merits. If the court wishes to avoid
deciding the constitutional issue, it will often be able to say that state remedies
have not yet been exhausted. On the other hand, if the court desires to make a
constitutional ruling, it is often just as easy for it to say that state remedies have
been sufficiently exhausted or that under the circumstances exhaustion will be
excused.
Id. at 21.
143 See Comment, Exhaustion of State Remedies Before Bringing Federal Habeas
Corpus: A Reappraisal of U.S. Code Section 2254, 43 NEB. L. REv. 120 (1963).
It evidently takes so long under the present requirements of Section 2254 to
mature a case for federal habeas corpus that the 'lighter' sentences of only a few
years are completed and the cases thereby become moot before they can even
receive a hearing.
Id. at 132.
144 Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. at 281 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
145 1n re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970). This rule is so strong that the Court
applied it even to a juvenile proceeding where a 12-year-old was faced with confinement
for six years. The Court gave a concise history of the due process requirement that a
criminal conviction be based upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt, noting that the
standard is applicable to "every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which [one]
is charged." Id. at 364.
146 Holland v. United States, 348 US. 121, 138 (1954). "The government must still
prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt though not to a mathematical
certainty." Id.
147The standard of proof in civil cases is a preponderance of the evidence. See
PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 97 (9th ed. 1964).
148 McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a Burden ol
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Although most other circuits have also maintained these separate
standards with respect to a trial judge's determination on the question
whether the evidence in a given case is sufficient to go to the jury, 49
until recently the "Second Circuit rule" held a single standard of
evidence applicable to both civil and criminal cases.150 Under this rule,
the application of the 'reasonable doubt standard' was reserved ex-
clusively for use by the jury in rendering its verdict. The question of
the sufficiency of the evidence to warrant submission of a criminal case
to the jury was evaluated by the same standard as that applied to civil
actions. Thus, whenever a federal trial judge believed that a reasonable
jury could find that the prosecution's evidence preponderated, he was
required to let the case go to the jury'51 although the jury was, of
course, not permitted to use the preponderance standard in its delibera-
tions.
In United States v. Taylor, 52 the Second Circuit overruled the
"single test" approach and held that it is a function of the court, upon
motion for directed verdict, to determine whether the evidence justi-
fies a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.' 53 However, the convic-
tion in Taylor, was unaffected by the court's resolution of the issue
Persuasion, 68 HARv. L. REv. 1382, 1383 (1955) (footnote omitted). In United States
v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 852 U.S. 882 (1956), Judge Frank (con-
curring) made the following comments on the two standards:
It has been suggested . . . that the civil standard - "by a preponderance" -
means that the inferences from the testimony are such as to persuade that the
occurrence of an essential fact was more likely or probable than its non-oc-
currence . . . that the criminal test - "beyond a reasonable doubt" - means
that those inferences are such as to convince that the occurrence of an essential
fact was much more likely or probable than its non-occurrence.
Id. at 286 (footnotes omitted).
140 In United States v. Leitner, 202 F. Supp. 688, 693 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd 312
F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1963), the court labeled this approach as the "majority test." See
202 F. Supp. at 693 n.2 for a survey of the treatment of the issue in each of the circuits.
150 United States v. Taylor, 464 F.2d 240, 242 (2d Cir. 1972).
151 United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 287 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882
(1956) (concurring opinion). In the Taylor case, 464 F.2d at 244, the court noted that in
determining sufficiency of the evidence, the "reasonable doubt standard" will apply
to the evidence in totality, and not to each element. See Holland v. United States, 348
U.S. 121 (1954).
152 464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
153 Id. at 243, Friendly, C.J. writing for the court, affirmed the "Curley test":
The true rule, therefore, is that a trial judge, in passing upon motion for di-
rected verdict of acquittal, must determine whether, upon the evidence, giving
fall play to the right of the jury to determine credibility, weight the evidence,
and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If he concludes that upon the evidence there
must be such doubt in a reasonable mind, he must grant the motion; or, to
state it another way, if there is no evidence upon which a reasonable mind might
fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the motion must be granted.
See Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837
(1947).
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since denial of the motion was found sustainable under either standard
of evidence. 1 4
The "single test" or "Second Circuit rule" originated in United
States v. Feinberg.5 In Feinberg, Judge Learned Hand challenged
the 'reasonable doubt standard' for its impracticability, commenting that
such a distinction was too tenuous "for day to day use."' 5  However,
Judge Hand did recognize that "[e]vidence . . . which merely pre-
ponderates is indeed different from evidence which excludes all
doubt. ... 157
Although findings of fact have traditionally been within the prov-
ince of the jury, the "Feinberg rule" seemed to demean the role of
the judge in his supervisory capacity. 58 Also, the Taylor court noted a
154 The facts of the case are as follows: Defendant Taylor and another were driving
from Canada into this country in a car given to Taylor by one Rudderow. Taylor was
stopped for "routine questioning" by a customs agent at a New York border crossing.
Taylor had no proof of ownership and, during an investigation of the vehicle, "thirty-
four counterfeit $20 Federal Reserve notes fell from a magazine which was on the back
seat. Forty-four $20 notes were subsequently found in ... road maps .... " Taylor later
admitted ownership of the magazine. Rudderow disclaimed the presence of the notes
in the car at the time it was given to Taylor. 464 F.2d at 245. Taylor was convicted of
possession of counterfeit bills with intent to defraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472.
155 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 822 U.S. 726 (1944). As suggested in
United States v. Leitner, 202 F. Supp. 688, 693 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), aff'd 812 F.2d 107
(2d Cir. 1963), a reading of the early case of Fraina v. United States, 255 F. 28, 35 (2d Cir.
1918), would seem to indicate that, prior to the "Feinberg rule," this circuit used the
"majority test".
156 140 F.2d at 594.
157 Id. Judge Hand also implied that, due to the "gravity of the consequences" in a
criminal trial, it is possible that the courts are "more exacting" regardless of what standard
is applied in submission of the case to the jury. Id.
158 See United States v. Masiello, 285 F.2d 279, 286-87 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring
opinion), in which Judge Frank found that, although it is not the judge's function to
"decide whether the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt," many courts have
held that it is a function of the court to direct a verdict of acquittal "if the judge rea-
sonably thinks that a reasonable jury could not find guilt proved beyond a reasonable
doubt" from the evidence presented. Id. at 286.
In analyzing the Feinberg rule, Judge Frank found that this aspect of the Court's
role in a criminal action was circumvented:
To put it succinctly, even if the judge has no doubt that the jury cannot rea-
sonably comply with his admonition that it must acquit unless it finds the
accused guilty beyond a reasonable doubt - i.e., if he has no doubt that a
reasonable jury could find guilt by no more than a preponderance of the evi-
dence- nevertheless the judge must let the jury return a verdict, and if that
verdict is adverse to the accused, the judge may not properly set aside the
verdict and enter a judgment of acquittal.
Thus in this circuit the reasonable doubt standard has no significance
whatever for the judge; its sole function is as a part of the instructions to the
jury.
Id. at 287.
See Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 19,47): "It is the function
of the judge to deny the jury an opportunity to operate beyond its province." See also
Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1899):
"Trial by jury" . . . is a trial by a jury of twelve men, in the presence and
under the superintendence of a judge empowered to instruct them on the law
[Vol. 47:250
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basic inconsistency in requiring a higher standard of proof for a verdict
and a lower standard for the evidence upon which such a verdict may
rest.'3 9 The growing dissatisfaction with the rule within the Second
Circuit'00 was clearly expressed by Judge Frank in the 1956 case of
United States v. Masiello.16' While concurring in the result reached by
the court, he cautioned that the "Second Circuit rule" would allow a
criminal conviction to stand where only the civil burden of proof had
been met and would thus run afoul of the constitutional guarantee of
proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 62
In rebutting Judge Hand's finding of impractibility in the appli-
cation of varying measures of proof, the Taylor court noted the exis-
tence of an intermediate standard - "clear and convincing evidence."'' 6 3
Chief Judge Friendly then asserted that this array of burdens of proof
must be considered in determining whether a question for the jury
existed,'6 4
A further reason given for the Taylor decision was that, in prac-
and to advise them on the facts, and (except on acquittal of a criminal charge)
to set aside their verdict if in his opinion it is against the law or the evidence.
1 9 464 F.2d at 242.
160 See, e.g., United States v. Glasser, 443 F.2d 994 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
854 (1971), where the court specifically rejected the Feinberg rule in favor of the majority
test applied by the Supreme Court in American Tobacco v. United States, 328 U.S. 781,
887 (1946); United States v. Lefkowitz, 284 F.2d 310 (2d Cir. 1960) in which the court
relied upon an earlier Fifth Circuit opinion in stating the applicable rule.
In other cases the court was more casual in its departure from the Feinberg rule,
apparently feeling more confident in taking such a step. See, e.g., United States v. Brown,
456 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1972); United States v. Kahaner, 317 F.2d 459 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 835 (1963); United States v. Robertson, 298 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1962).
101 235 F.2d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 1956) (concurring opinion).
162This "Second Circuit doctrine," I think erroneous. It reduces the criminal
standard to little more than a verbal ritual, a ceremonial set of words included
in the judge's charge ....
[f, for the judge, the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt test, can have no "quantita-
tive value" greater than the "preponderance" test, he may not use the criminal
test as either a pre-verdict or post-verdict check on the jury. . . . In short,
according to this doctrine, a criminal conviction does not necessarily mean an
adjudication of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but may well mean adjudica-
tion of guilt which can reasonably be by a preponderance only.
235 F.2d at 288 (footnote omitted).
103464 F.2d at 243, citing Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 353-54 (1960);
Woodby v. INS, 385 US. 276, 285-86 (1966).
In denaturalization cases the Court has required the Government to establish
its allegations by dear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence. The same burden
has been imposed in expatriation cases. That standard of proof is no stranger
to the civil law.
385 U.S. at 285 (footnotes omitted).
164 Progressing from Chaunt and Woodby (see note 163 supra), Chief Judge Friendly
observed:
Implicit in the Court's recognition of varying burdens of proof is a concomitant
duty on the judge to consider the applicable burden when deciding whether to
send a case to the jury.
464 F.2d at 243.
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tice, the "Feinberg rule" was no longer followed by the courts within
the Second Circuit.165 However, an examination of recent decisions
within the circuit reveals a more clouded picture. Earlier this year, in
United States v. Coblentz,16 6 the court reiterated the single preponder-
ance of evidence standard as controlling within the circuit and refused
to apply any other test for the submission of a case to the jury. How-
ever, many Second Circuit cases do reflect an abandonment of the single
test and an adoption of the majority rule,167 while other decisions
express doubt as to which standard should govern and, therefore, have
applied both.168
The effect of Taylor will be to clear up the confusion within this
circuit as to the standard of evidence necessary for submission of a
criminal case to a jury. While it has been stated that proof of a defen-
dant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is a basic proposition of our
law, the evidentiary rule within this circuit has been clearly inconsis-
tent with that concept.
Leaving Feinberg on the books thus creates a trap for districtjudges, a paper sword for prosecutors, and an unwarranted burden
upon criminal defendants'6 9
Having squarely confronted the problem, the Taylor court has re-
moved the trap.
AIRPORT SEARcHEs
United States v. Bell
In United States v. Bell17o the Second Circuit faced the task of
balancing the public danger posed by the current wave of airport hi-
165 Id. at 244.
166 453 F.2d 503 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 917 (1972).
167 See note 160 supra. These cases suggest that a complete abandonment of the
Feinberg rule had already been effected within this circuit. Contra, United States v.
Coblentz, 453 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1972).
168 See United States v. Leitner, 202 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), where the court
found that "[the] test of sufficiency of the evidence for the jury in a criminal prosecution
currently applicable within this circuit is not entirely free from doubt." Id. at 693. After
a discussion of the authority in support of each rule, the court found its decision sus-
tainable under either approach. In both United States v. Monica, 295 F.2d 400, 401
(2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 953 (1962), and United States v. lannelli, 461 F.2d
483, 486 n.4, (2d Cir. 1972), the court declined to decide which of the two standards to
apply and proceeded to apply both.
Finding the level of proof established by the prosecution in these cases to be suf-
ficient for the majority test enabled the courts to avoid the problem tackled in Taylor.
However, the effect of these decisions was to invoke the majority approach without
expressly overruling Feinberg since, in order to sustain a decision under both standards,
the stricter majority test would have to be met. Having passed this test, approval under
the Feinberg test would, of course, be automatic.
169 464 F.2d at 244 (emphasis added).
170 464 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1972).
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